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Pathological Counterinsurgency: How Flawed Thinking About
Elections Leads to Counterinsurgency Failure. Samuel R.
Greene. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018. ISBN 978-1-49853818-3. Sources cited. Index. Pp. ix, 211. $78.99.
During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet governments used puppet states and
guerilla forces to conduct proxy wars. Since that time, failing states and
transnational actors continue emphasizing insurgency actions short of
total war to gather popular support and replace existing governments.
Counterinsurgency forces often tout government elections held within
these states as a success metric. Pathological Counterinsurgency explores
the perceived links between election legitimacy and governmental power
as well as how successful governance strategies aid counterinsurgency
campaigns. The research seeks to discover why happy, quiescent
populations are less beneficial to insurgencies than villagers actively
opposed to current governments. Dr. Greene reviews political and
democratization theories to show how the U.S’s foreign election
manipulation during insurgency may appear as stabilization. Each of the
four case studies compare only internal governance examples during
counterinsurgency periods without relating operational details of hunting
down various insurgent miscreants as occurs in some other
counterinsurgency texts.
Greene’s core theory suggests elections, are insufficient to overcome
governmental flaws and create lasting improvements. Correlations
between government actions, popular legitimacy, and non-rebellious
countries forms the theory’s bedrock with background from how several
counterinsurgent theorists felt about elections. The literary review starts
with Mao as employed by Van Thieu, Che Guevara, and Castro to
emphasize how insurgencies meld with the populace. During
counterinsurgency planning, melding highlights why first actions increase
the contextual distance between population and insurgent through either
military force or fixing governance gaps like corruption, high taxes, and
poor economic conditions. Highlighted modern conflicts include
transnational insurgents like Al Qaida and ISIS in their operations across
national boundaries. Overall three democratization theories are offered as
strategies to improve compromised governments; minimalist through
solely military support, deepening existing strengths, or full institutional
rebuilds. All examined elections are democratic and Greene sees a
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reliance on elections as scoreboard for counterinsurgency success. Each
case study researches how elections may degrade legitimacy, showcase
problems, or suffer external manipulation to different outcomes rather
than simply trumpet success.
The case studies begin with Vietnam as a classic counterinsurgency failure.
Greene acknowledges the vast Vietnam War research available as a reason
to limiting focus to the Ngo Dinh Diem 1955 and 1961elections and the
General Nguyen Van Thieu elections 1965 and 1971. Detrimental to the
case for elections building legitimacy is Diem’s 1963 assassination by a US
supported coup and Thieu fleeing Vietnam before Saigon’s 1975 fall.
Diem’s failure to gain legitimacy leads to the US backed coup as well as a
growing counter-insurgency. Thieu’s first election appears as a U.S.
success despite his identification as a “bottom of the barrel” candidate (p.
76). Theiu’s regime, like Diems, appears marked by corruption even
during subsequent elections, again a poor sign for enhanced legitimacy. In
the end, the case concludes US inability to improve South Vietnam’s
government legitimacy or performance directly contributes to
counterinsurgency failure.
Turning to El Salvador during the 1980s, the next study examines a
potential counterinsurgency success. This twelve-year conflict (19801992) between the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)
and the Salvadoran government often is cited as successful while Greene
suggests these success areas are actually multiple failures generating an
illusory credibility derived from corrupt elections, human rights abuses,
and the government’s continued inability to deliver basic services. These
three factors are the same ones as previously cited for leading to
government failures. El Salvador’s success from those elections is depicted
as ignoring the oppressive, secret-police style techniques ensuring
elections generated desired results and degrading overall legitimacy.
While El Salvador appears better today, improvements in the text link
more directly to elections a decade later as FMLN candidates integrate
into the processes rather than any counter-insurgency gain.
The final focus examines how election processes influenced, and are
influencing, U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Always interesting
during comparisons is when Iraq receives mention ahead and in greater
proportion to Afghanistan despite U.S. efforts to aid Afghanistan occurring
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both first and longer than Iraqi operations. Studies show Iraq’s troop
deployment levels were significantly higher than Afghanistan for several
years but that top position switched in 2010 and has not changed since.
Greene considers both operations as failures with neither holding a
successful election nor defeating the insurgency while remaining troubled
by unsteady governments. However, both countries now face
transnational insurgencies rather than those present during previous
counterinsurgent campaigns and both installed governments have
conducted multiple successful, and peaceful, power transfers each. The
two governments do, without doubt, face continued challenges from
internal corruption, a record of human rights abuses, and an occasional
inability to support their own population but all stability starts
somewhere. After all, comparing early U.S. history to Iraq, Washington’s
first two terms probably were relatively unstable from an English
perspective.
Pathological Counterinsurgency was an enjoyable read about a difficult
subject. Unfortunately, the analytic areas remaining unexplained are the
direct correlations between how flawed election policies link to
counterinsurgency failures, one of the book’s main goals. Greene carefully
shows why legitimacy matters and where improved legitimacy enhances
popular satisfaction to counteract insurgent feelings. One can easily
understand why a government more interested in bribes and engaging in
text-only soldiers on pay rosters to supplement local leadership income
probably has difficulty delivering infrastructure and basic services.
Popular dissatisfaction then explains why those same individuals may
shelter insurgents who promise more livable alternatives. However, the
direct correlation between which policies led to failed elections in each
case and then how those factors lead to failed counterinsurgencies,
although promised early on, does not appear in the case studies. Each
case study explains why failing internal policies prevent independent
elections from curing any of a nation’s ills including insurgency. If Dr.
Greene had taken one more step to reach the titular expectations and draw
either an anecdotal or metric analysis for how those failed elections also
resulted in failed counterinsurgency efforts, the text’s overall impact would
have improved dramatically.
Overall, I enjoyed the case studies and the carefully built logic around
governance and legitimization practices in the various failed states during
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insurgency challenges. The comparison between past and recent conflicts
identifies the challenging problem in linking military strategies to Whole
of Government effects required for today’s interdependent world. The
modern tendency to jointly employ diplomatic, information, military, and
economic actions is the much improved over historic practices but will
require significant data to hone those desired tools. Green’s book makes a
useful read for either policy or insurgency experts dealing with building
and sustaining election practices but the lack of any direct correlation
between counterinsurgency efforts and election strategies prevents
Pathological Counterinsurgency from offering any prescriptions for
improved future performances.
Mark T. Peters II, USAF
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